

**BY ORDER OF THE  
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

**AIR NATIONAL GUARD INSTRUCTION 14-2  
MISSILE WARNING, VOLUME 3**



**27 JULY 2015**

***Intelligence***

**MISSILE WARNING UNIT INTELLIGENCE  
PROCEDURES**

**COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY**

---

**ACCESSIBILITY:** Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at [www.e-Publishing.af.mil](http://www.e-Publishing.af.mil) for downloading or ordering.

**RELEASABILITY:** There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

---

OPR: NGB/A2F

Certified by: NGB/A2  
(Col John F. Knabel)

Pages: 14

---

This publication implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-2, *Intelligence Rules and Procedures*, and is consistent with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-202, Volume 1, *Intelligence Training*, AFI 14-202, Volume 2, *Intelligence Standardization/Evaluation Program*, AFI 14-202 Volume 3, *General Intelligence Rules*, and AFI 36-2201, *Air Force Training Program*. This publication establishes the minimum standards for personnel performing intelligence duties to be used by all Air National Guard assigned or attached personnel to the 137<sup>th</sup> SWS/Intel Flight. This publication requires the collection or maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. Privacy Act System of Records Notice F011 AF AFMC B, Patriot Excalibur, covers required information. The authority to maintain the records prescribed in this instruction is Title 10 U.S.C. 8013, Secretary of the Air Force; AFI 36-2608, *Military Personnel Records System* and Executive Order 9397, *Numbering System for Federal Accounts Relating To Individual Persons*, as amended by Executive Order 13478, *Amendments to Executive Order 9397 Relating to Federal Agency Use of Social Security Numbers*. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af61a/afrims/afrims/>. Restrictions expressed in an instruction can be made more, but not less, restrictive by supplement. The provisions of higher-level publications take precedence over lower-level publications. This policy document supports all Air Force Intelligence Training Transformation (IT2) efforts as mandated by DoD and other national policy directives.

Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication. Route AF Form 847s through the appropriate functional's chain of command.

Unit may request waivers for tiered compliance items IAW AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management. National Guard Bureau (NGB)/A2 is the waiver authority for non-compliance items; these requests must be submitted through the chain-of-command to the publication OPR. In order for units to have time to prepare for compliance, this publication becomes effective 60 days after the publication date.

## Chapter 1

### GENERAL GUIDANCE

**1.1. Scope.** Mission success depends on this unit's readiness to perform assigned tasks satisfying Combatant Commander's (CCDR) requested capabilities. This volume defines roles, responsibilities and minimum requirements for establishing and sustaining intelligence support to the 137 SWS missile warning mission. It describes day-to-day management of required intelligence support and with the complementary references cited, this volume prescribes standard operational procedures to be used by all intelligence personnel supporting missile warning in the 137 SWS.

**1.2. References.** The primary references for intelligence support for missile warning are AFI 14-202, Volume 3; *General Intelligence Rules*, AFI 14-2, Volume 3, *Space Unit Intelligence Procedures*; AF Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) 3-1. Threat Guide, *Threat Reference Guide*; Joint Publication 3-14, *Space Operations*; and Air Force Doctrine Document 3-14, *Space Operations*.

**1.3. Waivers.** NGB/A2 is the waiver authority for this publication. Submit waivers to NGB/A2 and coordinate with Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)/A2 on all waiver correspondence. See AFI 33-360 for details on compliance waiver requirements (i.e. T-1, T-2 and T-3).

## Chapter 2

### INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

**2.1. Introduction.** The Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) will provide commanders, their staffs, operators, and other customers the best available intelligence information and materials to enhance readiness, facilitate planning and execute assigned missions. The SIO will verify all procedures are IAW AFI 14-202, Volume 3, *General Intelligence Rules*; AFI 14-2, Volume 3, *Space Unit Intelligence Procedures* (when published); and this publication.

**2.2. SIO Intelligence Responsibilities.** The SIO is responsible for the planning and execution of intelligence functions to support missile warning. The SIO will:

2.2.1. Lead, organize, train, and equip intelligence personnel and functions to support the unit missile warning mission.

2.2.1.1. SIO will ensure all combat mission ready intelligence personnel are certified by the squadron commander or director of operations, IAW ANGI 14-2 MW Vol 2.

2.2.2. Monitor unit activities and intelligence personnel schedules and provide required intelligence support for operations.

2.2.3. Coordinate intelligence support requirements, policies, and training for intelligence operators.

2.2.4. Coordinate with the national Intelligence Community (IC) and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to provide strategic vision on intelligence support and increased functionality to the overall Missile Warning program.

2.2.5. Ensure worldwide intelligence awareness in support of the missile warning mission.

2.2.6. Manage all intelligence activities, including request for and dissemination of Requests for Information (RFI).

2.2.7. Present any intelligence related Crew Information File (CIF) items to the 137 SWS/DO for approval to be posted in the CIF binder.

2.2.8. Ensure intelligence personnel:

2.2.8.1. Provide all-source intelligence to support the daily operations of the MW mission. Threat knowledge will include, at a minimum:

2.2.8.1.1. Threat missiles in selected countries with the potential for missile/space launches.

2.2.8.1.2. Likely Indications and Warnings that would occur prior to a missile/space launch.

2.2.8.1.3. Which countries are current hotspots due to current events.

2.2.8.1.4. Missile profiles, signatures, country studies and command and control.

2.2.8.1.5. Threats to missile warning space systems.

- 2.2.8.1.6. Threats include weather (terrestrial and space), cyber attack, direct ascent, Radio Frequency Interference (RFI)/Electromagnetic Interference (EMI), sabotage, and laser.
- 2.2.8.2. Prepare all-source intelligence, situation estimates, Initial Intelligence Reports (IIRs) and other intelligence documents.
- 2.2.8.3. Provide operations crews with situational awareness of factors affecting MW mission execution to include political-military situation and threat updates.
- 2.2.8.4. Perform intelligence operations in support of the 137 SWS Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements.
- 2.2.8.5. Print a pending launch slide and review the Daily Anticipated Activity Report (DAAR), Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Pending launch website/slides and any additional sites for any necessary changes to the slide.
- 2.2.8.6. Review CIF binder for new CIFs and annotate time and date CIF was reviewed.
- 2.2.8.7. According to what is posted in the DAAR or on the JSpOC pending launch website/slides, intel personnel will post possible system launches up to 10 days in advance (i.e., if today is 7 Jan, the latest date possible to be added to the pending slide is 17 Jan). Other launches listed as "to be determined" (TBD) will remain on the pending slide and updated as more current Intel is gathered.
- 2.2.9. Notify leadership of high-vis/profile events and errors.
- 2.2.10. Ensure operations plan/concept plan (OPLAN/CONPLAN) specific information is incorporated into training to the maximum extent possible.

**2.3. Written Guidance.** The unit Operations Review Panel (ORP) proactively considers current and long-term factors affecting the organization's ability to accomplish the mission, resulting in maximized mission effectiveness. The ORP ensures operations documentation is in place and tracks completion of applicable training and evaluation prior to implementing new or changed procedures. The ORP chair is the 137 SWS/DO. For more information on the ORP process, see AFSPCGM 13-1\_233SG SUP. The SIO will ensure intelligence flight representation attend the ORP meetings and will maintain written guidance in order to standardize performance and provide continuity on contingency operations, procedures and responsibilities, IAW ORP guidelines. The SIO will provide operations instructions, signed by the unit commander, for the following:

- 2.3.1. General organization and responsibilities of the intelligence section.
- 2.3.2. Intelligence personnel training program.
- 2.3.3. Unit intelligence standardization/evaluation program.
- 2.3.4. Intelligence support to mission planning.
- 2.3.5. Self-assessment procedures.
- 2.3.6. Exercise development and conduct.
- 2.3.7. Emergency protection and destruction of classified materials.
- 2.3.8. Intelligence oversight program.

2.3.9. Intelligence debrief and lesson learned processes.

**2.4. Automated Intelligence Systems.** Intel personnel must be trained and proficient on the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) work station (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System [JWICS]), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), and the applicable mission consoles.

2.4.1. Ensure records are managed per the online documentation system of record, Patriot Excalibur (PEX) checklists.

2.4.2. The SIO will ensure the unit is equipped with all automated intelligence systems required to support operations.

## Chapter 3

### PLANS AND EXERCISE PLANNING

#### **3.1. Plans.** The SIO will:

- 3.1.1. Ensure intelligence personnel understand unit OPLAN/OPORD tasking and related specific intelligence requirements.
- 3.1.2. Determine intelligence reference material requirements (to include mobility documents and references) based on mission requirements, unit operations, OPLANs/CONPLANs, Base Support Plans (BSPs), Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF), contingency, emergency war order and past ad hoc tasking. Use the MAJCOM designated Standard Intelligence Document List (SIDL) as the baseline for establishing the unit's intelligence reference library. SIOs with geographically separated units (GSUs) will monitor GSU requirements to ensure required documents are available.
- 3.1.3. Provide intelligence inputs to HHQ OPLAN/OPORDs, as required.

#### **3.2. Exercise Planning.** The SIO will:

- 3.2.1. Integrate intelligence functions in the unit exercise planning process IAW AFI 14-202, Volume 3.
- 3.2.2. Work with exercise planners to insert realistic intelligence scenarios to allow for learning opportunities for intelligence processes.
- 3.2.3. Submit and track lessons learned post exercise and for real-world events.

## Chapter 4

### EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT

**4.1. Employment and Sustainment Operations.** According to JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*, space-based sensors usually provide the first level of immediate missile detection. There is no room for error in strategic missile warning; therefore, all information provided must be timely, reliable, accurate, and unambiguous.

**4.1.1. SIO responsibilities.** The SIO is responsible for intelligence functions in the group. AFI 14-202, Volume 3 does not offer a category that covers the unit employment responsibilities of an intelligence unit that supports missile warning; therefore, the following requirements are to be followed.

4.1.1.1. Develop and maintain written checklists and/or procedures, IAW with unit ORP guidelines, to support intelligence support to missile warning. Intelligence personnel will be trained on checklist instructions.

4.1.1.2. Provide briefing support to include initial situation briefings, situation briefings and deployment briefings (when necessary prior to individuals deploying). Briefings must incorporate the latest intelligence information tailored to the audience including appropriate Force Protection Intelligence (FPI) information.

4.1.1.3. Ensure intelligence personnel working shifts are provided with a changeover briefing at each shift change. Rapidly analyze and disseminate significant and critical intelligence to appropriate work centers.

4.1.1.4. Establish Threat of the Day (TOD)/Threat of the Week (TOW)/Threat of the Month (TOM) Program. Ensure TOD/TOW/TOM program is tailored to the missile warning detection capabilities of your unit and that the intelligence is presented when required by the operators.

4.1.1.4.1. Provide threat intelligence on ballistic missiles, country of interest missile order of battles, space launch vehicles, space launch sites, counterspace threats pertinent to Defense Support Program (DSP) ground stations, links and nodes, and satellites, as well as the likelihood of DSP detection.

4.1.1.4.1.1. Analyze country studies and missile capabilities that pertain to missile warning detection.

4.1.1.4.1.2. Include as many details on the expected missile profiles as possible.

4.1.1.4.1.3. Analyze threat doctrine for how adversaries employ ballistic missiles.

4.1.1.4.1.4. Understand asymmetric threats to the unit mission.

**4.1.1.5. Intelligence Support/Situation Awareness – Live Operations Brief.**

4.1.1.5.1. Provide crew changeover to discuss events/trends and predicted upcoming Infrared activities and any expected weather impacts.

4.1.1.5.1.1. Note strategic launch activity.

4.1.1.5.1.2. Note expected mover event actions.



4.1.1.5.1.3. Note theater launch activity.

4.1.1.5.1.4. Note multiple launch activity.

4.1.1.5.1.5. Note space launch activity.

4.1.1.5.2. Use the Defense Special Missile & Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC) daily report as a baseline for missile and space launch warnings, in order to characterize and predict Infrared (IR) events.

4.1.1.5.3. Using DEFSMAC products, identify the likely missile/space launches for the next 30 days/1 week/24 hour period.

4.1.1.5.4. Review likely missile profiles, signatures, country of origin and command and control to expect.

4.1.1.5.5. Ensure timely notice is given to the operations crew when a Period of Interest (POI) is initiated indicating an upcoming launch is expected.

#### **4.1.1.6. Intelligence Support to Characterization of Missile Launch Activity.**

4.1.1.6.1. Work with the Test and Analysis Office to characterize IR activity by looking into past red force exercise data for likely trends that could assist with predicting future activity.

#### **4.1.1.7. Requests for Information (RFI).**

4.1.1.7.1. Review Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIRs), Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and ensure there are adequate Essential Elements of Information (EEI's) to guide the intelligence required to adequately address the CCIRs/PIRs.

4.1.1.7.2. Identify any gaps in the information desired by the commander and send RFI's to ensure the gaps are being researched and collected upon if necessary.

4.1.1.7.3. Ensure procedures are followed for obtaining RFI's from the intelligence community and the JSpOC.

#### **4.1.1.8. Analysis and Briefing Support**

4.1.1.8.1. Use all sources to do in depth research on commander's items of interest, using CCIR's as a guideline.

4.1.1.8.2. From the in-depth analytical research, develop a concise briefing.

4.1.1.8.3. Present the briefing in a concise manner at the appropriate classification. If there is information available at a higher classification than the briefing room; arrange for a follow up discussion at the higher classification level.

**4.1.1.9. Trending Program Support.** The unit trending program minimizes the impact of recurring operations weaknesses on unit mission accomplishment by analyzing and correcting operational deficiencies noted during training, evaluation, and operations. A two-step process, the program requires units to first compile and then analyze data to determine the root cause of a deficiency. The SIO will collect and analyze real world operations deficiency data and provide trending reports to the unit trending program Point of Contact (POC), 137 SWS/OSV, IAW AFSPCGM 13-1\_233SG\_SUP.

## Chapter 5

### DEBRIEF PROGRAM

**5.1. According to AFSPCI 10-415, *Weapons and Tactics Program Attachment 3*; debriefing is simply reconstructing and evaluating an event to determine how to replicate success and avoid repeat mistakes.** A successful debrief depends on the ability to critically analyze events and the willingness to admit mistakes. The debrief process should encompass a review of events, identification of problems, determination of root causes and development of lessons learned. Lessons learned should be captured in the Mission Ground Station (MGS) Evaluation/Training Trending Program (METT) and submitted to the Operations Review Panel (ORP) to allow for a fix action to be formulated and tracked. AFI 90-1601, *Air Force Lessons Learned Program* provides an excellent reference for the debriefing process and how to execute a lessons learned program.

5.1.1. The SIO will ensure debriefs are conducted after performance training and real world mission periods (i.e. real world operations with or without errors). Stan/Eval will be responsible for leading the real world operations debrief while Instructors will be responsible for the training debriefs.

5.1.2. Review of events: In this step, debrief participants are collecting observations which may point to problems encountered during the event. Participants should use all sources to assist them in faithfully recreating the event. Useful tools available to aid in reconstruction include screen captures, event logs, chat logs and archived disk data. Each individual must recognize how his or her actions fit into the overall reconstruction of the event and should be prepared to explain the event from their perspective. One technique that may aid in reconstruction is to develop a timeline with the events as they occurred chronologically. Special emphasis is then placed on potential problem areas.

5.1.3. Identification of problems (also known as Debrief Focus Points [DFP]): The observations collected during the reconstruction phase are the means by which participants will identify problems. Problems as defined here are, “Areas or aspects of the event which impeded achievement of the desired outcome.” For example, if the mission was to provide support to a real world deployment and they did not receive adequate intelligence to prepare them that would be a problem. DFPs focus on overall mission accomplishment not individual actions. However, individual actions may be contributing factors (CF) leading to a root cause (RC). To facilitate the debrief process, the DFP should be stated as a question. Therefore, using the example above the DFP becomes, “Why did the mobile ground station operations team not receive the intelligence support it needed?” There may be many contributing factors to the mistake. Participants should record these factors and tie them to the identified problem to aid in the next step of the debrief process, determining the RC.

5.1.4. Determination of RC: Determining the RC is as easy as determining why the problem occurred. The difficult part lies in digging down to the actual problem and disregarding issues that were not a factor in the actual problem. Here, the contributing factors identified in the previous step will aid in diagnosing the RC. Honesty and the willingness to accept fault are keys to performing this step successfully.

5.1.4.1. RC determination may be accomplished via the “why” technique. Using the example above, the DFP is:

5.1.4.1.1. DFP: “Why did the mobile ground station operations team not receive the intel support it needed?”

5.1.4.1.2. CF: I did not query all resources which would have provided a more complete picture.

5.1.4.1.3. “Why did I not query all resources which would have provided a more complete picture?”

5.1.4.1.4. CF: My checklist did not list all resources required.

5.1.4.1.5. “Why didn’t my checklist list all resources required?”

5.1.4.1.6. CF: The authors of the checklist were unfamiliar with the additional resources required and didn’t include them in the checklist.

5.1.4.1.7. “Why were the authors of the checklist unfamiliar with the additional resources required?”

5.1.4.1.8. RC: Because they were not trained on the additional resources required.

5.1.4.2. At a certain point further inquiry will not result in actionable solutions. That is the RC of the problem. In the example above, the RC of the problem is that mission planning guidance did not adequately address the need to prioritize actions in order to ensure that lower priority actions did not interfere with mission essential priorities.

5.1.5. Development of lessons learned. A lesson learned is a statement addressing the RC that prevents the problem from happening again. Good lessons learned are measurable and repeatable fix actions that lead to better job performance. A lesson learned must address four main points: when to enact the lesson, what specific actions to accomplish, how to accomplish those actions and why to comply with the lesson learned. A lesson learned should strike a balance between applicability and specificity. In other words, it must encompass the problem without being so broad as to apply in every circumstance and so narrow that the event has little chance of repeating.

5.1.5.1. The following formula has been very helpful as a template to start writing lessons learned: “When (circumstance: mission planning or executing), Opposite of RC, by Instructional Fix (proposed mechanism), so that DFP doesn’t happen.” Once comfortable writing lessons learned, using the formula word for word may no longer be necessary.

5.1.5.2. In the example above the root cause of the DFP was a lack of training to identify all intel resources required to provide operators a more complete intel picture. Therefore, a good lesson learned for the identified root cause is:

5.1.5.2.1. “Unit intel personnel will identify all required intel sources and require training of these resources to all intel operators. The SIO will then insure that these resources are added to the intel operators’ checklists.”

5.1.5.2.2. This lesson learned identifies when the action will be executed, what specific action to take, how that action will be accomplished and why to comply with

the lesson. It is actionable, measurable, and repeatable and will prevent the problem from recurring.

5.1.6. Process Improvement: As in the example above, lessons learned derived from events may drive checklist updates or procedural changes. Therefore, lessons learned that generate action items should be submitted to the ORP to track fix actions.

5.1.7. Debriefing is a developed skill that requires practice. Mission efficiency will increase as the debriefing process yields operators who continually dissect their performance to determine the best way to do the job and implement their fix

STANLEY E. CLARKE III, Lt Gen, USAF  
Director Air National Guard

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

**AFI 14-202, Volume 1, *Intelligence Training***

**AFI 14-202, Volume 2, *Intelligence Standardization/Evaluation Program***

**AFI 14-202, Volume 3, *General Intelligence Rules***

**AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, 25 September 2013**

**AFI 36-2201, *Air Force Training Program*, 15 September 2010**

**AFPD 14-2, *Intelligence Rules and Procedures*, 29 November 2007**

**AFSPCGM 13-1\_233SG SUP, *Space Operations Crew Force Management, Training, Standardization and Evaluation (DRAFT)*, Date TBD**

**ANGI 14-2 MW, Volume 1, *Missile Warning Unit Intelligence Training***

**ANGI 14-2 MW, Volume 2, *Missile Warning Unit Intelligence Evaluation Criteria***

***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

**AFI**—Air Force Instruction

**AFMAN**—Air Force Manual

**AFOSI**—AF Office of Special Investigations

**AFPD**—Air Force Policy Directive

**AFSPC**—Air Force Space Command

**ANG**—Air National Guard

**CF**—Contributing Factors

**CIF**—Crew Information File

**CCIR**—Commander's Critical Information Requirement

**CONPLAN**—Concept Plan

**DFP**—Debrief Focus Point

**DEFSMAC**—Defense Special Missile & Astronautics

**DSP**—Defense Support Program

**EEI**—Essential Elements of Information

**EIT**—External Intelligence Training

**EMI**—Electromagnetic Interference

**FPI**—Force Protection Intelligence

**FPIT**—Force Protection Intelligence Training

**IR**—Infrared

**JSpOC**—Joint Space Operations Center

**JWICS**—Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

**LL**—Lesson Learned

**METT**—Mission Ground Station (MGS) Evaluation/Training Trending Program

**NGB**—National Guard Bureau

**OPLAN**—Operations Plan

**OPR**—Office of Primary Responsibility

**ORP**—Operations Review Panel

**PIR**—Priority Intelligence Requirements

**POC**—Point of Contact

**POI**—Period of Interest

**RC**—Root Cause

**RFI**—Request for Information/Radio Frequency Interference

**SF**—Security Force

**SIO**—Senior Intelligence Officer

**SIPRNET**—Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

**THREATCON**—Terrorist Threat Conditions

**TOD**—Threat of the Day

**TOM**—Threat of the Month

**TOW**—Threat of the Week

**TTP**—Tactics, Techniques and Procedures